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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
NASOS SEVASTOPOULOS and 
KATHLEEN SEVASTOPOULOS, 
APPELLANTS/PETITIONERS, 
vs, 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 
APPELLEE/RESPONDENTS. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 920683 CA 
Priority No. 15 
Appeal from the Decision of the District Court Granting Summary 
Judgment and Dismissing Action in Fav-.r of the 
Board of Adjustment 
The Sevastopoulos', Petitioners herein, respectfully 
provide their appellate brief as follows: 
JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to § 78-2a-3 (2) (b), Utah Code Annotated, the Court 
of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of appeals from the 
district court review of the decision made by an agency in an 
adjudicative proceeding. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Board of Adjustment disregarded due 
process requirements during the hearing conducted on September 
16, 1991? 
2. Whether review by the District Court was limited to 
the Administrative Record? 
3. Whether the Board of Adjustment complied with its 
statutory mandate? 
4. Whether the "findings11 were supported by evidence? 
THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Point 1: As to Issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3: 
The review by the District Court should not have been 
limited to the administrative record. The District Court's 
affirmance of the Board of Adjustment Order was incorrect 
because the hearing before the Board of Adjustment did not 
proceed in accordance with due process requirements. 
Consequently, the District Court should have held a trial de 
novo, Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 
1984) . The District Court determined not to grant a trial de 
novo because of its interpretation of the controlling standard 
of review, which is a question of law. Accordingly, this Court 
2 
can review the decision of the District Court without giving 
deference thereto, as a correction of legal error. State of 
Utah v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991). 
The question of improper interpretation by an agency of the 
controlling statutes and ordinances, is a correction of error 
standard, with no deference given to the agency. Morton 
International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Coram., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
The "supplemental findings" and orders of the Board of 
Adjustment are contrary to the applicable statutory and judicial 
authority. The standard for review is a correction of error 
standard, with no deference given to the agency. Morton 
International, Inc., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Point 2: As to Issue No. 4: 
The "findings" and decision of the Board of Adjustment are 
contrary to the applicable statutory and judicial authority. 
The standard for review is a correction of error standard, with 
no deference given to the agency. Morton International, Inc., 
814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
The findings of fact of the Board of Adjustment are 
contrary to the substantial evidence introduced at the hearing 
3 
on this matter. The standard of review is whether "'the agency 
action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by 
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court.111 Morton 
International, Inc., 814 P.2d 581, 585 (quoting Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, § 63-46b(4)(g)). 
Point 3; As to the Grant of Summary Judgment by the District 
Court: 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states that 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. 
In the present case, there are sufficient facts at issue to deny 
the grant of summary judgment. This Court should remand for the 
occurrence of an evidentiary hearing to determine the facts due 
to the failure of the Board of Adjustment to make findings from 
competent evidence. That hearing should be held in accordance 
with standards of due process. 
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CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states as follows: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning -
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Article 1 § 7 of the Constitution of Utah states as 
follows: 
[Due process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
1. On or about June 25, 1991, appellants filed a petition 
for a variance request with the Board of Adjustment, 
2. A hearing on the Variance Request first was held on 
September 16, 1991, 
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3. Appellants did not receive written notice of the 
meeting. They received notice of this hearing approximately 
one-half hour prior to its commencement. 
4. On or about October 8, 1991, the Board of Adjustment 
issued its First Findings and Order for Case No. 1549-B. 
5. On or about February 27, 1992, appellants filed a 
Petition for Judicial Review with the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and a Request 
for Rehearing with the Board of Adjustment. 
6. On or about January 6, 1992, the Board of Adjustment 
reheard the case regarding the Variance Request. It issued its 
Findings and Order for Case No. 1549-B on or about January 28, 
1992. 
7. On or about August 24, 1992, the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian entered an Order granting Summary Judgment and Dismissing 
Action in favor of the Board of Adjustment. 
8. On September 23, 1992, appellants filed a Petition for 
Review. 
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9. On October 19, 1992, the Sevastopoulosf filed a 
docketing statement with this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Petitioners reside in a home located at 1425 East 
Tomahawk Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. The home is owned by a 
trust having its beneficiary as Kathleen Smith Sevastopoulos. 
Marion B. Smith is the trustee for the trust. See Variance 
Request, and Findings & Order, dated September 1991 ("1991 
Findings") and January 1992 ("1992 Findings"), and the 
Transcript of Board of Adjustment Case No. 1549-B, occurring on 
January 6, 1992 ("Transcript") , p. 13, which are included in the 
Addendum to the Brief of Appellants as Exhibits "A", "B", "C" 
and "D", respectively, and which are incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
2. Petitioners commenced the construction of a fence on 
both side yards of their property in about May 1991. See 
Transcript, Exhibit "D", p. 3. 
3. Petitioners were informed that they did not need a 
permit to have the fence built and hired a contractor to perform 
the work. 1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 2. 
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4. The fence is a concrete and block wall faced with 
stucco. See 1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3, and pictures 
presented to Board of Adjustment during the January 27, 1992 
hearing ("Pictures"), which are included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit ffEfl and incorporated herein by this reference. 
5. During the construction of the fence, a dispute arose 
between the petitioners and the neighbors directly to the east. 
As a result of that dispute, a complaint was made to Salt Lake 
City regarding the fence and a representative from the City came 
to the house. See 1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", and 1992 
Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 1. 
6. The City then requested that the work stop because the 
fence violated Salt Lake City ordinances and a special permit 
would be required. See 1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 5. 
7* The work ceased at the request of the City and the 
pictures demonstrate the incomplete construction. See 1992 
Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 5; and pictures, Exhibit "E". 
8. The fence remains uncompleted. 1992 Findings, Exhibit 
"C", p. 5; Pictures, Exhibit "E". 
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9. On June 25, 1991, Marion B. Smith, as trustee, and 
Kathleen Smith Sevastopoulos, petitioned the Board of Adjustment 
for a variance to allow the completion and retention of the 
fence. See Variance Request, Exhibit "A11. 
10. The purpose for requesting the variance was 
to allow the construction of a fence approximately 8 
feet in height. The variance is requested in order to 
provide security for the swimming pool located on the 
property. Due to the steep grade on the lot which 
required the driveway be cut below grades the eight 
foot height is requested to provide security for the 
pool area. 
See Variance Request, Exhibit "A". 
11. Further, the Variance Request provides that "Due to 
the steep grade on the lot, the driveway located along the 
property line where the fence is constructed, has been cut below 
grade.1 The resulting fence height from the high side is 
therefore low enough to be crossed by children in the area." 
See Variance Request, Exhibit "A". 
12. The safety to be obtained by the fence was important 
to the Petitioners because, among other reasons, 1) the trustee, 
Ms. Marion Smith, lived in a neighborhood in which a child had 
climbed into a neighbor's pool and drowned; 2) Petitioners often 
1
 The driveway was built below grade by the previous 
owners of the home. 
9 
leave their residence for extended periods while travelling; 3) 
the neighbors' children had gotten into Petitioners' back yard 
to play basketball; and 3) Petitioners had suffered difficulties 
with neighbors to the east, involving invasion of privacy, as a 
result of which police were called. See Transcript, Exhibit 
"D", p. 13. 
13. The fence, as built but unfinished, is on the west and 
east sides of the property. It traverses up the slope from the 
front of Petitioners' property. The fence has the architectural 
design as follows: 
i 
The length of each side of the fence is approximately 101.82 
feet on the petitioners' property. The fence steps at various 
intervals in response to the increasing slope on the back of 
petitioners' property. 
14. On the west side of Petitioners1 property, the fence 
has been completed. Approximately 75.75 feet of the fence is 
equal to or less than five feet (5') high in relation to the 
highest abutting property level, leaving 26.07 feet at eight and 
10 
one-eighth feet (8V) to eleven and one-quarter feet (11?f) in 
height. This is the highest side of the fence. See engineering 
diagram regarding "Walls Along Property Lines", which was 
provided to the Board of Adjustment and was attached to 
Petitioners' Response to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Wall 
Diagram"). See Transcript, p. 6, Exhibit "D". 
15. On the east side, the fence is not finished. It, 
also, is approximately 101.82 feet long on Petitioners' 
property. It steps at various intervals in conjunction with the 
slope of the land. A driveway was built by the previous owner, 
for which a grade change was authorized and a retaining wall 
installed. The top of this retaining wall substantially 
parallels the neighbors1 land. The new fence included an 
addition to this retaining wall. In total, the new fence 
exceeds the six foot height requirement on eight and three-
quarters feet (8W) , leaving approximately 93.07' of fence that 
is equal to or less than the limitation. See Wall Diagram. 
16. A hearing on the Variance Request first was held on 
September 16, 1991. See 1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p.l. 
17. Neither the petitioners, nor Ms. Marion B. Smith, 
received written notice of the meeting. In fact, the City 
admitted that neither Ms. Smith nor the Sevastopoulos' received 
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written notice. Accordingly, petitioners received telephonic 
notice of this hearing approximately one-half (?) hour prior its 
commencement. All other "interested parties", however, received 
notice of the hearing substantially in advance of the meeting. 
See Transcript, p. 2, Exhibit "D"; Petition for Judicial Review, 
which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "F" and is 
incorporated herein by this reference; and the Request for Re-
hearing, which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "G" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
18. During the hearing, information was provided to the 
Board of Adjustment, and summarized in the 1991 Findings. This 
information includes the following testimony 
(George Buys of Bush & Gudgell Consulting Engineers, 
Inc., spoke on behalf of the petitioners): the 
property owners are out of town for extended lengths 
of time and security for the swimming pool and back 
yard area is very important. . . . there was a 
retaining wall that allowed access into the 
applicants' rear yard. The applicants1 intent is to 
provide security for the swimming pool by adding the 
block fence on top of the retaining wall. . . . there 
are a number of walls in the area that exceed the 6-
foot height. 
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 2. 
(Captain Sevastopoulos): his neighbor's wooden fence 
was deteriorating and their children climb over the 
fence to play basketball in his back yard. . . . he 
travels extensively with his business and is fearful 
that one of the children or their friends might fall 
into the pool. 
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 2. 
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he was told by the contractor that a permit for 
the cinder-block fence was not needed. . . • some 
neighborhood fences are as high as his is. He told of 
neighborhood difficulties and problems with family 
members in the neighborhood that have contributed to 
the ill will against he and his wife. 
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3. 
(Mr. Taylor): he recently received a petition signed 
by numerous neighbors who are opposed to the fence 
height. 
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3. 
(Judith Moyle, resident of Tomahawk Drive, but not an 
abutting property owner): states that she serves on 
the Architectural Committee, however, later it is 
determined that the Architectural Committee on which 
she serves does not regulate petitioners1 property. 
She too has a pool, two dogs and is concerned about 
small children, but feels that the 6-foot fence around 
her property is adequate. 
the city zoning requirements will be maintained 
if there is a conflict with the private covenants. 
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3. 
(Faith Cortrell, resident of Tomahawk Drive, but not 
an abutting property owner): there was a well-
maintained brown wood fence between the applicant's 
property and the adjacent property. There is also a 
guard-dog on the Smith property that would prevent 
children from entering their back yard. 
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3. 
But see pictures of "well maintained fence" presented to the 
Board of Adjustment. 
(Jean Calder, resident of Tomahawk Drive and abutting 
property owner to the east of petitioners' property): 
the walls are much too high especially on the west 
side [not the side next to her property].... she 
does not feel the applicants1 pool represents a 
security risk because they have an existing wall and 
13 
gate plus a gate in the driveway, as well as a guard 
dog and a pool cover. 
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3. 
19. The Board of Adjustment then went into Executive 
Session. Whereupon, "Mr. Fenn made a motion to approve a 
special exception for the fence to exceed the height limit to a 
maximum of 6 feet from the neighbor's ground level on the east 
side in a parallelogram configuration; the fence on the west 
side may not exceed the 6 feet from the ground level as measured 
from the neighbor's side of the fence." See 1991 Findings, 
Exhibit "B", p. 4. 
20. "The motion was seconded by Mr. Hafey. All voted 
"Aye" except Mr. Chambless who voted "No". The motion carried 
by a vote of three to one." See 1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 
4. 
21. Subsequently, petitioners filed a Petition for 
Judicial Review with the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and a Request for Rehearing 
with the Board of Adjustment. See Exhibits "F" and "G", 
respectively. 
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22. Thereafter, Petitioners attempted to obtain and 
provide information to the City concerning this and other 
issues. 
23. The Board of Adjustment agreed to re-hear the Variance 
Request. On January 6, 1992, the second hearing occurred. See 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C". 
24. In the 1992 Findings & Order, the Board summarizes the 
information obtained during the hearing; however, it failed to 
make any findings of fact. See 1992 Findings, Exhibit "C". 
25. The 1992 Findings & Order contain the following 
information that is relevant to this proceeding: 
(Mr. Taylor): the applicants1 attorney requested a 
rehearing of this case based on improper notice. He 
said the applicants' notice was returned to the city 
the day of the meeting. This did not allow time to 
remail the notice to the proper address. Mr. Taylor 
said that in an attempt to remedy the problem, the 
applicants were notified by telephone on the afternoon 
of the September 16 meeting, but they felt it was not 
sufficient time to prepare for the hearing. He said 
that Bruce Baird, the Board's attorney, recommended 
rehearing the case. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 1. 
(Mr. Wheelwright) : the wall varies in height from 11 
to 14 feet. [But see the Wall Diagram]. The 
applicant maintains that the excessive height is 
needed for security reasons. Planning Staff believes 
it is for visual impairment into the rear yard area. 
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. . . the pool's motorized cover wa^ ^stalled by the 
Fields when they had the pool constructed.2 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 2. 
(Ms, Flanders, representing the petitioners): the 
increased height of the fence is to prevent children 
from getting into the swimming pool area. Prior to 
constructing the higher walls, there were problems of 
this nature. . . . her clients are out of the country 
approximately six months out of the year. Their 
concern is for the safety of the neighborhood 
children. . . . the electronic pool cover does not 
make conditions safer; the combination of water and 
electricity actually creates a more dangerous 
situation. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 2. 
there is no guard dog on her clients' property, 
only a large dog. . . . this animal is boarded each 
time her clients leave the country for an extended 
period of time; therefore, it would not be a hindrance 
to children getting into the back yard. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 2. 
a number of neighbors have signed a petition 
indicating they have no objection to the height of the 
fence. . . . it would be very costly to conform to the 
height restriction because the fence has already been 
faced with stucco. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3. 
Ms. Flanders presented photographs of a wooden 
fence along the east property line. . . . the wooden 
structure has been referred to in previous testimony 
by the neighbors as a 'well-preserved fence', but the 
photographs show otherwise. . . . a child could very 
easily climb over the wooden fence. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3. 
2
 The Fields' were the previous property owners. A letter 
was introduced by Mr. Wheelwright that allegedly was authored by 
Mr. Fields and had been faxed from California for substantive 
evidence in the proceeding. 1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 2. 
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one of the considerations to be made in a 
determination for a special permit or a variance is 
how well the fence fits in with the neighborhood. She 
presented photographs of other fences in the immediate 
neighborhood to show that granting the variance 
requested by the applicants will not be in conflict 
with surrounding properties. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3. 
the head of the Home Owners Association has 
signed a petition as an individual stating there is no 
objection to the height of the walls. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3. 
(Mr. Calder, resident of Tomahawk Drive and abutting 
property owner to the east): there are no masonry 
walls along Tomahawk Drive that come anywhere near a 
fifteen-foot height. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3. 
(Mr. Gordon Roberts, counsel for Scott and Jean 
Calder): presented a petition signed by additional 
neighbors as of January 1, 1992, stating their 
opposition to the fence height.3 The applicants 
should be required to live with the decision made by 
the Board in September of last year. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3 - 4. 
(Judith Moyle, a resident of Tomahawk Drive, but not 
an abutting property owner) : Mr. Hal Hawk, who is the 
sole representative of the architectural review 
committee for the home at 1425 E. Tomahawk Drive,4 
has not given any variances on height outside the 
limits of the covenants. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 4. 
3
 The neighbors signed three petitions regarding this 
Variance Request, some of which signed all three petitions. 
4
 Mr. Hawk was not present at the hearing. See 1992 
Findings, Exhibit "C", regarding record of appearances. 
17 
(Marion Smith, trustee of the trust owning the subject 
property) : She has had the experience of living in a 
neighborhood where there was a 4-foot wall around a 
swimming pool. Several children climbed the wall and 
one of them drowned. She said that when the present 
owners consulted her about the wall, she advised them 
to do everything necessary to protect children from 
the pool. She said this obviously was not good 
advice, but she said the wall was built in good faith 
to protect the neighborhood children. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 4. 
(Captain Sevastopoulos, resident of the subject 
property): he travels extensively and wants to 
protect himself from any liability which may result 
from the neighborhood children gaining access to the 
pool. . . . the increased height of the fence is 
needed to provide this protection. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit ffC", p. 4. 
(Dr. Lynn Pershing, a resident of Tomahawk Drive, but 
not an abutting property owner): the applicants1 
concern for the safety of the neighborhood children is 
commendable, but . . . there has been no problem in 
this regard with the other pools in the neighborhood. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 4. 
26. The Committee then went into Executive Session. Mr. 
Fenn, a member of the Board, stated that "a good contractor with 
a concrete saw could cut the offending points down in a matter 
of one-half hour.5 He, then, moved to continue the variance 
previously granted, whereby the fence would be allowed to six 
feet from the highest abutting land. This variance, however, 
was conditioned upon resolution of encroachments on city 
5
 There was no evidence or testimony to support this 
statement. 
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property.6 The Board of Adjustment continuously was informed 
that the issue concerning encroachments was not within its 
jurisdiction. See Transcript, Exhibit "D", p. 1; 1992 Findings, 
Exhibit "C", p. 6. 
27. The Board of Adjustment approved the motion of Mr, 
Fenn, with one abstention and three in favor. See 1992 
Findings, Exhibit lfC", p. 6. 
28. The Board of Adjustment is in possession of several 
exhibits presented during the hearing, which were not included 
in the record, including the three petitions, pictures, maps, 
and diagrams. See e.g., Transcript, Exhibit "D", pp. 6, 9. 
29. The Sevastopoulos» filed a Petition for Review with 
the Third Judicial District Court. 
30. The Board of Adjustment filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which requested the District Court to rule that it had 
6
 Petitioners had been informed by the City and Counsel 
for the City that the subject and issues regarding encroachment 
on City property, which has been caused by numerous residents of 
Tomahawk Drive, as well as other areas in the City, would not be 
an issue in this hearing and that Petitioners should limit their 
comments and presentation to disregard this matter. See 
Transcript, Exhibit "D", pp. 1, 15-16. 
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no jurisdiction to consider the factual findings or the 
applicable law in regard to the agency action. 
31. The Sevastopoulos1 opposed the Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Their Memorandum asserted the due process 
requirements had not been met and the agency had not followed 
its statutory mandate to deny the variance. 
32. Prior to the Order of the Third Judicial District 
Court, Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, the Board of Adjustment 
did not make any findings of fact and did not consider the 
statutory requirements for granting and denying the variance 
request. See 1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 6. 
33. Consequently, the Court required the agency to enter 
"Supplemental Findings" in support of its decision. A copy of 
the Supplemental Findings is included in the Addendum as Exhibit 
"H" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
34. Thereafter, the Court entered its Order Granting the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, a copy of which is included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit "I" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
The issues that are at the heart of this case involve the 
extent of due process to which petitioners should be entitled in 
a variance hearing. In the present case, the Sevastopoulos1 
were denied the right to even expect competent evidence. 
Prior to the first hearing before the Board of Adjustment, 
petitioners received a one-half hour telephonic notice. 
Conversely, all other "interested parties" received substantial 
notice by mail. During the second hearing, the Board of 
Adjustment considered "evidence" from non-present witnesses. It 
also listened to testimony regarding issues that the City and 
the City's Counsel had stated were outside the jurisdiction of 
the Board and would not be considered in this hearing, and thus, 
were supposed to have been prohibited from consideration. 
Although petitioners may not be entitled to all of the penumbra 
of rights granted in a formal judicial forum, certainly there 
should be due process protections. This Court should consider 
the standard of review in light of those protections. 
At the first hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Petitioners/Appellants argued that the Court could consider 
additional evidence because of the lack of due process in the 
earlier informal hearing. Although the Court did grant 
Petitioners1 request to mandate the making of findings of fact 
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to support the decision of the Board of Adjustment, the Court 
determined that it could not hold a trial de novo and must defer 
to the Board of Adjustment. Thus, the Court granted the Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed by the Board of Adjustment. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE HEARINGS DID NOT OCCUR IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS 
The essence of the concept of due process is fair play and 
the idea that if an interest being defended is of value, the 
defendant ought to have his or her day in court and a real 
opportunity to be heard. Further, due process aims at "fair 
dealing, adequate hearing, and the opportunity to be heard." 
16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 813. International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
Point l: The First Hearing Was Given Without Sufficient Notice 
To Meet Due Process Requirements. 
Many jurisdictions firmly have established that due process 
requires adequate notice of proceedings given to persons whose 
interests are affected so that these persons have an opportunity 
to be heard. In the instant case, the first hearing was given 
without sufficient notice to meet due process requirements. In 
fact, the appellants received a one-half hour telephonic notice, 
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while other "interested parties" received sufficient written 
notice to prepare for the meeting. 
This case is remarkably similar to Gibbons v. Arizona Corp. 
Comm., 390 P.2d 582 (Ariz. 1964). In Gibbons, the Arizona 
Corporation Commission reinstated a certificate of convenience 
and necessity held by another corporation. At the time the 
hearing was conducted, a commissioner informed the attorney for 
Motor Carriers by telephonic notice of the hearing and its 
purposes. Id. at 585. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the 
telephonic notice given in this case, at the time the hearing 
was being held, did not afford an opportunity to be heard. 
In addition, in the instant case, the Salt Lake City 
Attorney, the Planning Staff and the Board of Adjustment 
confirmed the issues to be addressed during the second hearing 
and instructed the Sevastopoulos1 to refrain from making any 
presentation regarding the "encroachment" issues.7 They were 
7
 The "encroachment" issues, briefly, involve numerous 
residents, including the Petitioners, that have landscaped on 
City owned property located in the foothills. The City is 
developing a policy concerning the treatment and potential 
resolution of these encroachments. Such policy development is 
an action independent from the adjudicative proceeding which 
resulted in the decision by the Board now being appealed by the 
Sevastopoulos'. It must be an independent action because it 
does affect numerous residents city wide. 
In fact, to date, the Sevastopoulos1 have not been informed 
of the finalization of any formal policy by the City. 
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told that no response would be appropriate or allowed. Yet, the 
determination of the Board of Adjustment considered the issues 
of encroachment and restricted the variance granted to the 
Sevastopoulos1 based on these issues. Of course, the 
Sevastopoulos1 were not prepared to respond to the encroachment 
issues, and such consideration violated their right to notice 
and true opportunity to be heard. 
Although the Board of Adjustment graciously listened to the 
information provided at the second hearing, there was no 
discussion of the evidence provided at the meeting and there was 
no deliberation regarding the standards for granting or denying 
the variance requested by the Sevastopoulos'. Many of the 
testimonials included a reference that the Sevastopoulos1 should 
be required to "live by" the previous decision of the Board of 
Adjustment. Consequently, the Board adopted the same result as 
it previously reached with additional restrictions based on the 
encroachment issues. 
Point 2; The Admissibility Of Hearsay Evidence Should Have Been 
Limited. 
Many courts hold that hearsay evidence is admissible in 
administrative proceedings, as long as admission of the evidence 
meets the tests of fundamental fairness and probity. Bustos-
Torres v. I.N.S., 898 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1990); Calderon-
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Ontiveros v. I.N.S., 809 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1986); Trias-
Hernandez v. I.N.S., 528 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1975). 
Courts even have observed that hearsay evidence may 
constitute substantial evidence if it has probative value and 
bears indicia of reliability. Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145, 
149 (9th Cir. 1980) . The Calhoun Court recognized that no 
bright line test can be established to determine whether 
evidence is probative and bears the indicia of reliability. To 
assist the analysis, however, the Court adopted a number of 
factors to consider. These factors include (1) the 
consideration of statements that are signed and sworn to as 
opposed to anonymous, oral, or unsworn; (2) whether or not the 
statements are contradicted by direct testimony; (3) whether or 
not the declarant is available to testify and, if so, whether or 
not the party objecting to the hearsay statements subpoenas the 
declarant; (4) the credibility of the declarant if a witness, or 
of the witness testifying to the hearsay; (5) and whether or not 
the hearsay is corroborated. Id. at 149. 
In the instant case, a letter from Mr. Fields was 
introduced. This letter was not notarized and there appears to 
be questions of authenticity. Appellants were not afforded the 
opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Fields, or to verify the 
authenticity of the letter. In fact, appellants were denied a 
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copy of the letter and any information from which Mr. Fields 
could be located (appellants understand that Mr. Fields is a 
resident of California). Appellants, therefore, were prejudiced 
by the introduction of this letter.8 
In addition, the Board considered hearsay statements from 
Ms. Moyle as to the determinations of the Architectural 
Committee for the Sevastopoulosf property. The Committee was 
not present and Ms. Moyle is not a member thereof. Yet, members 
of the Board of Adjustment were quite concerned with the 
information alleged by Ms. Moyle as to the intentions of the 
Committee. 
Other evidence was considered by the Board from neighbors, 
who may have been providing information in good faith, but had 
no personal knowledge of the events in question, particularly 
concerning the children actually getting into the back yard of 
the Sevastopoulos1 property. 
8
 This letter purported to provide evidence that children 
had not been a problem on the property. This was the only 
evidence contrary to thit provided by Captain Sevastopoulos that 
could be considered to be from personal knowledge. Yet, the 
information was provided by a faxed letter, without any 
verification or ability of the Sevastopoulos' to question the 
substance therein. 
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Further, in direct contravention of the pictures shown, 
there was evidence that the Sevastopoulos f did not need to build 
a fence on the east side because there was a pre-existing, well 
maintained wood fence on the property. The pictures of the wood 
fence demonstrate, without a doubt, that it was not in good 
condition and that it would not deter a child from getting into 
the back yard of the Sevastopoulos1 property.9 
The vast amount of evidence considered by the Board of 
Adjustment that was against the variance request, did not 
exhibit the degree of reliability and probativeness to be 
useable in an adjudicative proceeding. The rights of the 
Sevastopoulos1 to confront witnesses and to require some 
authentication have been violated. The Sevastopoulos1 are 
entitled to a trial de novo in an objective forum on their 
variance request. 
9
 A curious fact exists when examining the pictures of the 
wood fence. From the east property belonging to the Calders, it 
is possible to see that the fence of the Sevastopoulos1, reaches 
above the wood fence only on its architectural points, i.e. only 
because it is designed differently from the slat wood fence on 
the Calder's property. 
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ARGUMENT II 
REVIEW BY THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT LIMITED 
TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
In the present case, the Board of Adjustment did not make 
Findings of Fact from which the Court could review and consider 
the Order issued by the Board until after the Court determined 
to grant the Motion for Summary Judgment. Certainly, there can 
be no consideration of "findings" by the District Court if there 
are none. The "Findings & Order" made by the Board after each 
adjudicative proceeding simply summarize "testimony" given in 
the hearing by various individuals, repeat the motion made by 
the Board, and identify the vote. In addition, the information 
provided to the District Court did not include all Exhibits 
presented to the Board of Adjustment and the Petitioners 
objected to the lack of inclusion of all information. Finally, 
there were no reasons ven by the Board of Adjustment for its 
determination, its ju *nt of credibility, or other relevant 
matters. The "Administrative Record" is deficient and the 
District Court was entitled to receive competent evidence to 
make a determination as to whether the Order of the Board of 
Adjustment was reasonable in light of all of the evidence. 
Section 10-9-15, Utah Code Annotated, provides that an 
aggrieved party may "'maintain a plenary action for relief1" 
from any determination of the Board of Adjustment by filing a 
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Petition for Judicial Review within thirty (30) days of the 
decision. In Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P. 2d 482 (Ct. 
App. Utah 1990) , the Court found that "f [t]he statutory language 
•plenary action for relief therefrom% presupposes the continued 
existence of the administrative action, thus suggesting an 
appeal rather than a trial de novo." Id. at 486 (quoting 
Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P. 2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 
1984)). "However, f[t]he nature and extent of the review 
depends on what happened below as reflected by a true record of 
the proceedings, viewed in the light of accepted due process 
requirements. '" Id. (quoting Denver & Rio Grande W. RR. Co. v. 
Central Weber Sewer Improvement Dist. , 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d 
884, 887 (1955)). 
Upon consideration of the events before the Board of 
Adjustment, it becomes clear that the review must be more than 
of the record of the proceedings. The hearings did not occur in 
accordance with due process requirements. "Evidence" was 
submitted by people without personal knowledge. "Evidence" was 
submitted in written form without any foundation or ability to 
ask questions as to clarification or additions to the content 
thereof. The first hearing was given without sufficient notice 
to meet due process requirements. In fact, the petitioners 
received a one-half hour telephonic notice, while other 
"interested parties" received sufficient written notice to 
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prepare for the meeting. Also, the City Attorney, the Planning 
Staff and the Board of Adjustment defined the issues to be 
addressed during this hearing. Yet, the determination of the 
Board of Adjustment considered issues about which the 
Sevastopoulos1 were not prepared to respond and were told they 
could not discuss. The second hearing was meaningless due to 
the failure of the Board of Adjustment to require property 
evidence and to consider their statutory mandate. 
Although the Rules of Evidence may not be enforced at the 
Board of Adjustment hearings, due process mandates the 
opportunity to rebut the evidence used against the petitioners. 
Such rebuttal could not be pursued against "witnesses" that were 
not present, against witnesses without personal knowledge of 
factual events, or in regard to issues that were not to be 
addressed at the hearing. 
This Court should require the satisfaction of due process 
requirements and look only to competent evidence, provided by 
personal knowledge, where there has been an opportunity to 
cross-examine (or question in the informal context of this type 
of hearing). The District Court was not restricted to 
consideration of the Administrative Record. 
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ARGUMENT III 
THE BOARD OP ADJUSTMENT DID NOT COMPLY 
WITH ITS STATUTORY MANDATE 
llf[T]he reviewing court may consider whether the 
municipality acted in conformance with its enabling statutes and 
ordinances pursuant to its comprehensive plan, f lf Sandy City v. 
Salt Lake County, 794 P. 2d 482, 489 (Ct. App. Utah 1990) 
(quoting Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 
P.2d 27, 28-29 (1965)). 
In Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States 
Telephone, 846 P.2d 1245, n.5 (Utah 1992), the court noted that 
"the authority of state administrative agencies to establish 
legal rules is limited by the agency's organic statute, statutes 
the agency administers, constitutional law, and the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. § § 63-
46b-l to -22, enacted in 1987 and made effective January 1, 
1988." 
Similarly, in Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 
1981), the Court held that zoning authorities are bound by the 
terms and standards of their ordinances and cannot grant or deny 
conditional use permits in derogation of those standards. 
31 
In the instant case, however, the Board of Adjustment did 
not act in conformance with Section 21.80.270, Salt Lake City 
Ordinance. Section 21.80.270, Salt Lake City Ordinances, 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
A. As empowered by Section 21.06.02 0, or its 
successor, the board of adjustment shall have the 
authority to grant special permits to exceed the 
height regulations, provided that careful 
consideration shall be given to the established 
character of the affected neighborhood and 
streetscape, to the maintenance of public and private 
views, and to matters of public safety, as follows: 
4. Fences, walls or other similar structures 
incorporating ornamental features or architectural 
enhancements which extend above the allowable height 
limits; 
5. Fences, walls or other similar structures which 
exceed the allowable height limits, when erected around 
schools and approved recreational uses which require 
special height considerations; 
6. Fences, walls or other similar structures which 
exceed the allowable height limits, in cases where it is 
determined that an undesirable condition exists because of 
the abnormal intrusion of offensive levels of noise, 
pollution, light or other encroachments on the rights to 
privacy, safety, security and aesthetics. 
C. The board of adjustment may deny any 
request: 
1. That is not in keeping with the character of 
the neighborhood and urban design of the city; 
2. That would create a walled-in effect in the 
front yard of any property in a residential district 
where the clear character of the neighborhood in front 
yard areas is one of open, free-flowing spaces from 
property to property; or 
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3. When there is a driveway on the petitioner's 
property or neighbor's property adjacent to the 
proposed fence, wall or other similar structure that 
presents a safety hazard. 
(emphasis added). 
It is unknown whether the Board of Adjustment considered 
the established character of the neighborhood, of which 
petitioners presented numerous photographs; the public and 
private views; or the public safety. It is clear from the 
pictures that there are many fences in the immediate 
neighborhood exceeding the six foot ordinance. Most 
importantly, the Board of Adjustment failed to consider matters 
of public safety. Appellants have a pool in their back yard. 
From the only competent testimony, it is clear that petitioners 
have had unsupervised neighborhood children playing in their 
back yard. In addition, although a child had not yet drown in 
this neighborhood, Ms. Marion B. Smith personally knew of a 
child drowning in an affluent neighborhood, where children are 
thought to be appropriately supervised; it can happen to anyone. 
Apparently, however, the Board of Adjustment did not take this 
fact into consideration. 
Prior to the District Court's mandate, the Board of 
Adjustment did not make any findings regarding these essential 
elements. The Board of Adjustment failed to find the existence 
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of any of the facts enumerated in the provisions regarding 
denial of the variance. 
Consideration of the record provided to the District Court 
leads to the reasons for the lack of findings on these factors. 
Although the Board of Adjustment may have desired to comply with 
its duties and obligations, it simply did not have competent 
evidence before it from which to make the required findings that 
could support its determination. The decision of the Board of 
Adjustment should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE FINDINGS ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE 
The Supplemental Findings entered by the Board of 
Adjustment pursuant to the District Court's mandate include six 
(6) simple paragraphs without any specific factual detail. 
These findings clearly are contrary to the evidence, 
particularly in light of the probative, reliable evidence 
presented to the Board. 
The Petitioners presented the following evidence in support 
of their Variance Request: 
a. The purpose for requesting the variance was 
to allow the construction of a fence approximately 8 
feet in height. The variance is requested in order to 
provide security for the swimming pool located on the 
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property. Due to the steep grade on the lot which 
required the driveway be cut below grades the eight 
foot height is requested to provide security for the 
pool area. 
See Variance Request, Exhibit "A". 
b. The Variance Request provides that "Due to the 
steep grade on the lot, the driveway located along the 
property line where the fence is constructed, has been cut 
below grade.10 The resulting fence height from the high 
side is therefore low enough to be crossed by children in 
the area." See Variance Request, Exhibit "A". 
c. The Wall Diagram designating exactly which 
sections violate the ordinance and variance granted by the 
Board of Adjustment. The Wall Diagram demonstrates that 
the east side exceeds the height limitation granted by the 
Board of Adjustment, (which allows measurement from the 
highest abutting property), by eight-and-three-quarters 
feet (8%') out of the 101.82' total length, and the west 
side exceeds the height limitation in approximately twenty-
six-and-seven-hundredths feet (26.071); while recognizing 
that these measurements are sums of points along the fence 
line where the height limitation is exceeded. 
d. Testimony of Mr. George Buys of Bush & Gudgell 
Consulting Engineers, Inc., while Petitioners were present: 
10
 The driveway was built below grade by the previous 
owners of the home. 
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the property owners are out of town for extended 
lengths of time and security for the swimming pool and 
back yard area is very important. . . . there was a 
retaining wall that allowed access into the 
applicants1 rear yard. The applicants1 intent is to 
provide security for the swimming pool by adding the 
block fence on top of the retaining wall. . . . there 
are a number of walls in the area that exceed the 6-
foot height. 
1991 Findings, Exhibit ffBfl, p. 2. 
e. Testimony of Captain Sevastopoulos: 
his neighbor's wooden fence was deteriorating and 
their children climb over the fence to play basketball 
in his back yard. . . . he travels extensively with 
his business and is fearful that one of the children 
or their friends might fall into the pool. 
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 2. 
he was told by the contractor that a permit for 
the cinder-block fence was not needed. . . . some 
neighborhood fences are as high as his is. He told of 
neighborhood difficulties and problems with family 
members in the neighborhood that have contributed to 
the ill will against he and his wife. 
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. AC. 
he travels extensively and wants to protect 
himself from any liability which may result from the 
neighborhood children gaining access to the pool. . . 
. the increased height of the fence is needed to 
provide this protection. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 4. 
f. Testimony of Judith Moyle, resident of Tomahawk 
Drive, but not an abutting property owner: 
the city zoning requirements will be maintained 
if there is a conflict with the private covenants. 
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. AC. 
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g. Pictures demonstrating character of neighborhood 
and numerous other fences built therein that exceed the six 
feet limitation. 
Pictures, Exhibit "E". 
h. Presentation by Ms. Flanders on behalf of the 
petitioners: 
the increased height of the fence is to prevent 
children from getting into the swimming pool area. 
Prior to constructing the higher walls, there were 
problems of this nature. . . [Petitioners] are out of 
the country approximately six months out of the year. 
Their concern is for the safety of the neighborhood 
children. . . . the electronic pool cover does not 
make conditions safer; the combination of water and 
electricity actually creates a more dangerous 
situation. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "0", p. 2. 
Contrary to the assertion made by some of the neighbors, 
there is no guard dog on [Petitioners'] property, 
only a large dog. . . . this animal is boarded each 
time her clients leave the country for an extended 
period of time; therefore, it would not be a hindrance 
to children getting into the back yard. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 2. 
a number of neighbors have signed a petition 
indicating they have no objection to the height of the 
fence. . . . it would be very costly to conform to the 
height restriction because the fence has already been 
faced with stucco. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3. 
Ms. Flanders presented photographs of a wooden 
fence along the east property line. . . . the wooden 
structure has been referred to in previous testimony 
by the neighbors as a 'well-preserved fence', but the 
photographs show otherwise. . . . a child could very 
easily climb over the wooden fence. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3. 
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one of the considerations to be made in a 
determination for a special permit or a variance is 
how well the fence fits in with the neighborhood. She 
presented photographs of other fences in the immediate 
neighborhood to show that granting the variance 
requested by the applicants will not be in conflict 
with surrounding properties. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3. 
the head of the Home Owners Association has 
signed a petition as an individual stating there is no 
objection to the height of the walls. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 3. 
i. Testimony by Ms. Marion Smith, trustee of the 
trust owning the subject property: 
She has had the experience of living in a neighborhood 
where there was a 4-foot wall around a swimming pool. 
Several children climbed the wall and one of them 
drowned. She said that when the present owners 
consulted her about the wall, she advised them to do 
everything necessary to protect children from the 
pool. She said this obviously was not good advice, 
but she said the wall was built in good faith to 
protect the neighborhood children. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 4. 
The "evidence" presented to the Board of Adjustment in 
contravention of the Variance Request included substantial 
hearsay statements without any protection of authenticity, or 
ability to question, due to the absence of the witnesses and any 
verification of the statement such as by affidavit with attached 
notary.11 
11
 Testimony by Ms. Judith Moyle, a resident of Tomahawk 
Drive, but not an abutting property owner: 
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Other "evidence" against the Variance Request was provided 
without personal knowledge, such as the following: 
j. Testimony by Ms. Faith Cortrell, resident of 
Tomahawk Drive, but not an abutting property owner: 
there was a well-maintained brown wood fence between 
the applicant's property and the adjacent property. 
There is also a guard-dog on the Smith property that 
would prevent children from entering their back yard. 
1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3. 
Ms. Cortrell's testimony about the fence clearly is rebutted by 
the pictures taken and presented to the Board of Adjustment. 
See Exhibit "E". Further, as previously stated, the dog owned 
by Petitioners is boarded during trips taken by the 
Sevastopoulos'. Finally, because Ms. Cortrell does not live 
next door, and has not demonstrated any other way of knowing, 
her testimony regarding the prevention of children from the back 
yard is without any evidentiary basis. 
Mr. Hal Hawk, who is the sole representative of the 
architectural review committee for the home at 1425 E. 
Tomahawk Drive, has not given any variances on height 
outside the limits of the covenants. 
1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 4. Mr. Hawk was not present at 
the hearing. See 1992 Findings, Exhibit "C", regarding record 
of appearances. 
A letter was introduced by Mr. Wheelwright that allegedly 
was authored by Mr. Fields and that had been faxed from 
California for substantive evidence in the proceeding. 1992 
Findings, Exhibit "C", p. 2. The Fields apparently owned the 
property prior to Petitioners. Petitioners have yet to be given 
a copy of this letter. 
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The initial Supplemental Finding provides that the Board 
does not find any "special circumstances attached to the 
property which do not generally apply to other property in the 
same district. All properties on the north of Tomahawk Drive 
bordering the City's foothill property have similar slope and 
other topographical factors in common." This finding clearly 
contravenes the evidence presented. Consider the Pictures. 
They demonstrate the difference in the slope on the 
Sevastopoulos' property as compared to the slope on the Calder's 
and the Anderson's property. The Sevastopoulos1 property was 
excavated to allow for the installation of a swimming pool and 
to create a flattened effect for the rear yard. The other yards 
have not been changed in this manner. The excavation is severe, 
and is to the extent that the pre-existing retaining wall along 
the east side was even with the Calder's property, rather than 
rising above the same. In addition, the Sevastopoulos' property 
has a swimming pool with an electric cover. Certainly, this 
creates a special circumstance coming within the considerations 
of public safety. Finding No. 1 is contrary to the evidence. 
Finding No. 2 states as follows: 
No hardship exists from circumstances peculiar to the 
property and not from conditions that are generally 
applicable to the neighborhood because, again, all 
uphill foothill properties on Tcrahawk are similarly 
situated. 
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This Finding diametrically opposes the evidence for the same 
reasons that Finding No. 1 is insufficient; the properties are 
not all similarly situated. Further, there are hardships 
because of peculiar circumstances in that the Sevastopoulos1 are 
away from their residence for extended periods of time and there 
is a pool in a back yard in which unsupervised, neighborhood 
children have been caught playing. 
Finding No. 3 is more egregious when considering the 
evidence. The Finding states that to allow the fence to exceed 
the height permitted "would constitute a visual blight and eye 
sore on the neighborhood and would substantially affect the 
comprehensive plan of zoning in the City. This is especially 
true given the unpermitted encroachment of the side fences into 
the City's property on the foothills." First, the Court has 
available to it in the Addendum the Pictures demonstrating the 
architectural design of the finished side of the fence and can 
see the extent of which a change in "visual blight and eye sore" 
would be achieved by cutting down the fence. The Pictures 
demonstrate the close proximity in height, except for the 
difference in design, of the Sevastopoulos1 fence and the 
Calder's fence. 
In addition, consideration of the Pictures of other 
walls/fences presented by the Sevastopoulos1, which walls were 
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identified as existing in the immediate area, makes it 
incomprehensible to determine the basis for the finding that the 
fence would "substantially affect the comprehensive plan of 
zoning in the City." 
Finally as to Finding No. 3, the consideration of the 
encroachment issue clearing was outside the jurisdiction of the 
Board of Adjustment and was an issue expressly precluded from 
the Sevastopoulos1 presentation by the City.12 
Finding No. 4 completely ignores the competent evidence 
regarding the children being caught in the Sevastopoulos1 
property and the testimony from the personal knowledge of the 
trustee regarding the drowning of a child in an affluent 
neighborhood. It states that the only "hardship which may exist 
caused by the removal of the side fences is either economic . . 
. or . . . self-created by the petitioners' construction of the 
improvements without first seeking a building permit and 
completing the improvements in violation of a stop-work order." 
12
 The Petitioners recognize that the encroachments caused 
by themselves, as well as those caused by their neighbors and 
other residents around the City, must be dealt with through the 
enactment of a policy by the City and resulting compliance 
therewith. This realization, however, does not make it proper 
for the Findings to include reference to, and to be based on, 
these encroachment issues. 
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Further, Finding No. 4 ignores the evidence, including 
testimony and pictures, that the fence has not been completed in 
violation of a stop-work order or otherwise. 
Finally, Finding No. 4 also fails to consider the evidence 
provided that the Sevastopoulos1 were informed that they did not 
need a building permit to construct the fence.13 
Finding No. 5 states as follows: 
Because the rear fence is lower and more easily 
climbable than the side walls or fences there is no 
safety justification for the excessively high side 
walls. Further, the Board believes that there is no 
significant safety risk posed by anyone climbing the 
walls to enter the Petitioners1 pool. The pool can be 
secured by means more appropriate and less violative 
of the zoning code. 
First, Finding No. 5 discusses the status of the rear 
fence, however, the Board of Adjustment definitely understands 
that the landscaping is not finished, and in fact, due to the 
potential City policy regarding encroachments, the fence is 
13
 Clearly, the neighbors and the Board of Adjustment were 
affected by the anger or frustration resulting from the 
commencement of construction of the fence prior to the 
Sevastopoulos1 requesting a permit. The testimony, however, 
explained that the Sevastopoulos1 were unaware of the 
requirement to obtain a permit and had personal reasons for 
building the fence to the height planned. Additionally, the 
neighbors demonstrated that many had appeared successfully 
before the Board of Adjustment to obtain variances. Transcript, 
Exhibit "D", p. 14. Unfortunately, the unusual sequence of 
events seems to have severely affected the outcome of this 
proceeding. 
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likely to be removed by mandate. The Board has utilized the 
encroachment issues to injure the request by the Sevastopoulos1 
and, yet, has refused to acknowledge the effect thereof when it 
is in favor of the Sevastopoulos1.1A The "belief" by the Board 
that no safety risk is involved, clearly contravenes the 
competent evidence that children have been in the back yard and 
that unsupervised children drown in unprotected swimming pools. 
Finally, there was no evidence to support the finding that there 
are other means available to secure the pool. 
The final Finding No. 6 appears to be a conclusion of law, 
rather than a finding of fact, in that it specifies that the 
Sevastopoulos1 "failed to meet their burden of proving any of 
the conditions above." Again, however, this "finding" is 
contrary to the competent, admissible evidence presented to the 
Board of Adjustment. 
ARGUMENT V 
THERE IS NO REASONABLE BASIS TO JUSTIFY THE ACTION 
OF THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
AND THE DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED 
"[T]he courts will not consider the wisdom, necessity, or 
advisability or otherwise interfere with a zoning determination 
14
 Most likely, the City policy will require removal of the 
rear fence. Thereafter, the Sevastopoulos1, or other property 
owner, will build a new fence for protection. 
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unless 'it is shown that there is no reasonable basis to justify 
the action taken. f" Sandy City, 794 P.2d at 486. In the 
present case, there is no competent evidence, that meets the 
requirements of due process, to provide a reasonable basis for 
the action taken by the Board of Adjustment. Further, although 
the Board of Adjustment clearly had the right and the ability to 
determine credibility of witnesses, there is no justification 
for making certain determinations that must be implied to 
support the Board's decision. Those necessary implications 
include a finding that the character of the neighborhood would 
be effected. The Board of Adjustment was presented with 
numerous photographs of walls and fences exceeding the six foot 
height restriction. There was no contravention of the existence 
of these walls in the immediate neighborhood. 
One must assume that the Board of Adjustment determined 
that public safety did not require the fence to be at this 
height. Did it accept the testimony of the neighbors generally 
stating that they did not believe that the children would be in 
the petitioners' back yard over the testimony of the petitioners 
that the children were in the back yard? Again, a belief is not 
personal knowledge and should not be used to contradict 
competent testimony. 
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As to public views, did the Board of Adjustment determine 
that it was more important for Ms. Calder, the neighbor to the 
immediate east of the petitioners, to be able to see over her 
six foot fence and into the back yard of the petitioners? In 
this regard, the Court should compare the height differences of 
the wooden fence on the Calders1 property and the wall on the 
east side of petitioners1 property. In fact, the Calderfs 
objected to the height of the west fence, not the east fence. 
See 1991 Findings, Exhibit "B", p. 3. 
CONCLUSION 
In the present case, the Sevastopoulos1 yet have had an 
opportunity to present their request for a variance to an 
impartial forum with due process protections that are deserved 
in this type of proceeding. The evidence, and thus, the 
determination of the Board, was tainted. The chances of the 
Sevastopoulos1 were not the same as those of the other neighbors 
that had received variances from the Board. Yes, some of this 
was due to the Sevastopoulos1 lack of understanding regarding 
the necessity of a permit. That lack of knowledge, however, 
should not effect the considerations of whether they are 
entitled to a permit. Finally, the issues about possible 
encroachments cannot be allowed to affect the determination 
regarding the variance because such effect clearly contravenes 
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the jurisdictional and due process requirements of notice and 
opportunity. 
A new hearing should be held before an impartial tribunal. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully request that they be 
granted the opportunity to appear in a trial de novo, which 
should meet the standards of due process, and that the Court 
grant such further relief as it deems proper. 
DATED this 
^ ff day of June, 1993. 
FLANDERS 6 ASSOCIATES 
Brenda L. 
Dena—C^_Sa 
Attorneys for 
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